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Collaboration – the new funder 
fashion 
 
Everyone is talking about collaboration 
these days. You hear it in development 
conferences and webinars; you read about 
it in reports and blogs. In the aid sector, 
funder collaboratives are almost the new 
orthodoxy. Interest in funder collaboration 
has exploded, with a huge number of 
reports on the subject in the last five 
years, extolling the tantalising benefits. 
Foundation networks consider 
collaboration to be one of the most critical 
strategic issues.1 Studies suggest that, 
given the scale and social complexity of 
the development challenges today, 
funders will increasingly realise the 
limitations of working in isolation and will 
instead seek to collaborate with others.2 
For some collaboration conjures up the 
magic words ‘financial leverage’. 
 
 
 
But words are easier than actions. The 
practice of funder collaboration lags well 
behind the rhetoric.3 Funders prescribe 
collaboration as a good thing for others, 
but do not always take their own advice. In 
reality many foundations remain deeply 
ambivalent about funder collaboration. 
They find that a collaborative approach 
challenges traditional ways of working.4 
They balk at leaving their identity at the 
door. They fear the extra costs and 
                                                 
1 From research interviews with AGAG, Foundation 
Center, FCAA and EFG. 
2 Fulton, Kasper and Kibbe 2010:4 
3 Proscio 2010: i 
4 Leat 2009 
reduced flexibility that deeper levels of 
collaboration may involve.  
 
Some commentators are already 
challenging the emerging orthodoxy. Craig 
Dearden-Phillips asks: “Why do we all 
dance to the discordant tune of 
collaboration? In the third sector we are far 
too eager to collaborate…slaves to an 
orthodoxy that collaboration always leads 
to better outcomes…Joint working goes 
against the grain.”5 
 
What everyone agrees on is that there is 
limited practical evidence to draw on. 
Despite the stated intentions there are few 
documented examples of funder 
collaborations – and fewer still that are 
candid enough for others to learn from. 
This note contributes to redressing this 
imbalance in a small way. It explores the 
experience of a significant collaboration 
between four foundations who had the 
vision and courage to pool their funding 
($13 million in total) to work together on a 
joint project in Tangababwe.6 This paper 
outlines the story of this collaboration, the 
hard work and effort involved, and the 
mixed outcomes. It identifies the major 
learning from this experience. Ambition, 
Commitment, Trust and Structures and 
systems – the ACTS of collaboration 
emerged as key themes. Each was both 
intrinsic to the success of the initiative, but 
also contributed to its failures. We 
highlight seven top tips for foundations, 
international NGOs and bilateral donor 
agencies contemplating collaboration with 
other funders. 
1. Treat pooled funding with 
trepidation  
2. Choose suitable friends  
3. Travel to the field together  
4. Invest sufficient senior staff time 
                                                 
5 Craig Dearden-Phillips 2011 
6 Names disguised for confidentiality 
“No private funder alone, not even 
Bill Gates, has the resources and 
reach to move the needle on our 
most pressing and intractable 
problems.” Fulton, Kasper, and Kibbe 
Praxis Note 64: Funder collaboration – a compelling and cautionary tale © INTRAC 2013   3 
5. Focus on the partner(s), not just 
the technical programme 
6. Let go of control to genuinely share 
ownership  
7. Organise appropriately.  
 
Dreaming of a different way 
 
It all started with a casual conversation 
back in 2004. Two highly experienced 
development workers, who were now in 
leadership roles in large foundations, were 
bemoaning the fragmented donor 
approach to funding in Africa. They were 
deeply frustrated that this lack of funder 
collaboration was leading to duplication in 
programming, segmented approaches, 
half-measures in implementation, and at 
best only mediocre progress. 
 
They began to dream of a different 
dynamic. They asked: “What if?” What if a 
collaboration of funders could deliver a 
holistic best-practice response? What if 
they could also model a different way of 
working? Might this even change the 
global rules of the game for funders 
today? 
 
Their dreams resonated with others. Four 
foundations were particularly interested. 
Shared professional relationships and 
good organisational reputations in the 
sector helped build trust between them. 
The funders also all had strategies to 
channel larger funds to fewer projects in 
order to maximise impact, making them 
more open to the idea of collaboration with 
other funders. After careful discussions 
with their leadership and boards the four 
agencies decided to go for it. They opted 
to pool their funds in a common pot (an 
intense level of collaboration - see 
Appendix) in the hope that this would 
enable them to: 
1. Create a larger pool of funding, to 
deliver a bigger programme. 
2. Simplify life for grantee partner 
organisations to only have to deal 
with one body. 
3. Learn from varied experiences, 
skills and knowledge of agencies 
and individuals. 
4. Have a greater combined influence 
with key players. 
5. Set an example to partners – “walk 
the talk of collaboration.” 
 
 
 
Grim realities 
 
The excitement at getting started was 
short-lived, however. At that early stage, 
few could have predicted the frustration of 
the next two-and-a-half years. The 
protracted and painful ‘storming’ phase 
lived up to its reputation. 
 
The four funders quickly realised that 
despite their shared aspirations, they were 
“radically different organisations with 
radically different methods and 
approaches”. They had different reasons 
for joining – one was most interested in 
leveraging funds; another wanted to leave 
a collaboration legacy; another was 
passionate about changing the ways 
funders work together. While two 
members had worked in funder 
collaborations before, two had not. Some 
were more used to taking an engaged 
approach to funding, while others tended 
to operate as hands-off donors. Some had 
a definite five-year timescale, but for 
others the initiative was more open-ended. 
Some needed hard quantitative return on 
investment metrics, while others preferred 
more qualitative measures of success.  
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They soon realised at a deeper level how 
different they were in “our values, the 
ways we operated, the ways we defined 
success, our characters and 
personalities”. They were trying to fuse the 
best of each, but felt like they were 
experiencing the worst of all. There was a 
lot of tension between the self-confessed 
“highly opinionated” steering group 
members who were all used to leading 
and shaping their own organisations. They 
were all “feisty and daunting personalities” 
as one board member commented. 
 
This lack of coherence proved costly. 
Members spent 18 months trying to agree 
an official collaboration document. The 
confused identity of the collaborative at 
this time made it very difficult for them to 
engage in productive relationships with 
other stakeholders, in particular in-country 
intermediary partners (whom they needed 
to implement their programme).  
 
They had carefully mapped and analysed 
the capacity of the potential intermediary 
partners. They eventually short-listed two 
international NGOs. It then took 18 months 
of proposals, feedback, reiterations, and 
negotiations, before one of the agencies 
was accepted in principle. But after a 
further six months of requested redesign, 
the international agency decided it had 
had enough. They withdrew from the 
initiative (to the shock of the funders).  
 
Negotiations were still progressing with the 
other NGO (which we will call PVO). It had 
also been accepted in principle. Although 
they knew that the proposal required more 
work, the steering committee signed the 
contract (without carrying out standard 
partner appraisal processes). They felt 
they were running out of options and 
needed to get something moving. As one 
said: “We jumped on PVO’s proposal 
when we knew it was not great or ready.” 
Their impatience came back to haunt them. 
 
The lack of clarity in the early years also 
cost others dear. The university contracted 
to design and manage a rigorous 
evaluation system estimated that they 
spent an extra $100,000 in staff time just 
to respond to the collaborative’s mistrust, 
constant questioning, and frequent 
requests for adaptations. To enable closer 
and better relations with the field the 
collaborative tried setting up an in-country 
office. But this seemed to make the 
situation even worse as there was simply 
another intermediary to speak through. 
Furthermore the staff recruited to the office 
all failed to perform to expectations.  
 
Setting up the collaborative was intended 
to simplify relations with partners, as the 
grantees would only deal with one 
organisation rather than four. But because 
they were pooling funding in a joint 
venture, they had no existing grant 
management systems. They continually 
had to either create something from 
scratch or use a template from one of the 
members. Once they designed something, 
then they were keen to adapt and improve 
it. From partners’ point of view, this meant 
the goal posts were constantly changing. 
Members admit: “There were changing 
demands over time as we had no set rules 
or procedures.” It also meant that in some 
cases the systems were diluted to the 
lowest common denominator, particularly 
when faced with time pressures. A number 
of steering committee members admitted: 
“We would not accept this level of 
reporting for any other project.”  
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Not surprisingly, being part of the 
collaborative was taking up a considerable 
proportion of steering committee 
member’s time. They estimate that each 
organisation invested 25–30% of senior 
management time (usually split between 
two people), amounting to almost 10% of 
the total project budget. As one committee 
member admitted: “this has taken up way 
more time than any of us have ever done 
with any other project anywhere else in the 
world”. The funder collaborative was 
taking a hands-on, engaged approach to 
the funding, so the steering committee in 
Europe spent considerable time 
discussing detailed project management 
issues in Tangababwe. As a result, 
committee meetings tended to be lengthy. 
Yet, due to the problems they were facing, 
and the need for consensus, most 
members also agreed that “we did not 
allocate enough staff time to do the job 
properly”. They were highly involved 
during meetings, but less so between 
them.  
 
Being part of the collaborative at this time 
was “draining and demoralising” for 
members. It brought angst and frustration. 
As one member admitted: “Because so 
much was at stake in this innovative 
project, there was always a high anxiety 
level. We felt we needed to control it, but it 
did not know what we wanted to control.”  
 
Making it work 
 
Many agencies would have given up at 
this point. Those involved were sorely 
tempted. Instead they invested even more 
to make it work and get beyond the 
storming phase. 
 
They spent time in deepening 
understanding of each other and 
developing trust. Field visits together 
proved pivotal. As one member sad: 
“Spending time together on field trips led 
to a step change in relationship. The field 
trips really helped us step up a gear.” They 
were able to discuss their responses to 
practical field issues, which highlighted 
who they were and what they really 
thought - in ways that abstract discussions 
about documents had never done. By 
choosing to prioritise and schedule joint 
travel to the field, they developed much 
greater levels of trust. A deep level of 
professional respect developed that 
transcended organisational differences. 
 
Trust was the key ingredient in changing 
the dynamics. As one member 
commented: “As trust grew, so my 
commitment increased. I felt responsible, 
not just to the project, but to the fellow 
steering committee members”. As this 
trust developed, the foundations gradually 
felt safer in compromising their own 
interests. While some of the very different 
understandings of and approaches to 
development were never fully resolved, 
members began to realise that it was 
possible to accommodate different points 
of view. They were able to recognise and 
accept differences without needing to fight 
about them. Some of the parties 
compromised significantly, giving up 
previous organisational requirements. 
Collaborative members also accepted the 
loss of autonomy and recognition that was 
inherent in collaboration. They were even 
able to accept that any pooled funding 
“requires some distancing from your own 
organisation”. To a degree they all had to 
ring fence the initiative internally as 
collaboration was so foreign to the usual 
ways of working.  
 
In any collaboration it is a real challenge to 
speak with a single voice. All members 
bring in their own perspectives and 
opinions. In the early years, it was as if 
stakeholders had to deal with a many-
headed monster, each with a different 
voice. Collaboration members realised 
how important it was to speak with one 
voice. They worked very hard and 
relatively successfully to establish this. At 
times they refused to meet other 
stakeholders unless all four agencies 
could be present or at least until a clear 
message had been agreed.  
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Creating a secretariat for the collaboration 
also made a massive difference. As one 
committee member said: “It got things 
moving. Beforehand, all the creative and 
strategic energies of the steering 
committee were sapped by day-to-day 
management issues.” By hiring a part-time 
administrator, it meant there was someone 
to “drive through stuff between meetings” 
and do the myriad of office jobs, such as 
organising files, writing up minutes and 
following up on action commitments. 
 
Furthermore the arrival of new steering 
committee members improved the internal 
dynamics. One agency added a second 
member to the committee and two of the 
agencies changed one of their 
representatives. As an internal review 
pointed out: “Individuals on the steering 
committee have been more important than 
the organisations involved.” Partly 
because of these new arrivals, they went 
back to the drawing board to re-
conceptualise the work. They asked 
whether it would be simpler to switch from 
pooled funding to a strategic alignment 
(whereby they would jointly fund PVO, but 
keep their own systems and ways of 
working). They decided to continue pooled 
funding, but boost their collaborative efforts. 
They started to develop a shared theory of 
change and in time produced a revised 
concept document and operational plan. 
 
Greater clarity among the members 
enabled them to make some tough 
decisions. They closed the field office in 
Tangababwe, and appointed independent 
consultants instead to act as in-country 
liaison. Previously they had divided the 
programme management role and the 
financial management between two 
members (to avoid any member having 
too much power). But this lack of 
integration was highly unproductive, so 
they merged the roles into one member.  
 
But perhaps the hardest decision still 
awaited them. With the merger of the 
programme and financial management, 
some of the underlying differences 
between the collaborative and PVO were 
exposed. The reports did not give the 
collaborative the information it needed. 
There was considerable dissonance 
between PVO’s business model and the 
expectations of the collaborative. The unit 
costs of implementing the project as it 
stood appeared to make sustainability 
impossible. Unexpected overspends came 
to light. Trust degenerated quickly and the 
relationship unravelled within weeks. 
Ironically while the project itself was in 
crisis, the collaborative itself was 
performing “at the top of its game”. 
 
The collaborative took the radical decision 
to accelerate PVO’s transition of the 
programme to a local organisation 
(something discussed previously, but 
never seriously planned). It was a high risk 
option as the local partner has limited 
capacity and experience of grant 
management. But with just one year’s 
funding and a clear timeline for exit, this 
transition has helped focus the programme 
on becoming more sustainable and 
ensuring that local government takes 
greater responsibility in implementation.  
 
A happy ending? 
 
So does this story have a happy ending? 
Was the collaboration worth all the effort? 
 
Most members agree that if you are 
thinking about the specific project in 
Tangababwe then probably not. At least 
not yet. But if you are thinking about the 
learning that members gained about 
collaboration - that they are now applying 
to other relationships with funders globally 
- then they believe it was a successful 
learning experience. 
 
The collaboration did realise a number of 
the intended benefits for the project. Not 
only did it have four times the budget, but 
it also enabled the project to draw on the 
distinct technical and management 
expertise of each member. Their different 
ways of working and emphases enriched 
the collaboration – for example they took 
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the need for rigorous evaluation more 
seriously as a result. As a collaborative 
they had access to each other’s networks 
and contacts. As four agencies together 
they had greater weight and influence with 
different stakeholders. Working together 
also gave them courage and confidence to 
try something audacious and impressive.  
 
But collaboration came at a high price. It 
consumed huge amounts of senior staff 
time, particularly at the start and at points 
of crisis. And even then it wanted more. 
The need to reach consensus meant that 
decision-making was often slow – some 
members described it as procrastination in 
the early years. These delays made 
relationships with external partners 
problematic.  
 
Funder collaboration clearly does not 
simplify the complexities and challenges of 
sustainable development in extreme 
contexts. In some ways it adds yet another 
layer of complexity. Funder collaboration 
cannot obviously guarantee project 
success. And yet this is ultimately what it 
is all about. As one board member said, 
everything really depends on whether lives 
have been changed on the ground: “This 
is the most important part. If there is no 
change here, then there is no point in a 
funder collaborative. It is not about funders 
just working together.” 
 
Five years since it started, the project can 
only point to limited progress despite the 
huge investment of resources and energy. 
According to the external evaluation, there 
are few areas where statistically significant 
evidence of change exists and most of 
these are largely related to the provision of 
inputs. Obviously without clear success on 
the ground to point to, the expected 
positive influence on development policy 
has not materialised. There are plenty of 
reasons for the lack of success in such a 
challenging context with weak civil society 
and local government. It may just be too 
early to say. It takes time for the benefits 
to filter through. 
 
Having said that, however, all the funders 
involved believe that what they learnt from 
this first-hand experience of an intense 
collaboration was invaluable for their 
future strategies and ways of working with 
other funders. They found that learning 
first-hand by collaborating together was 
much more intense than reading about 
others’ experiences. As one said: “If you 
have not felt the pain of collaboration, you 
have not really taken the risk, nor will you 
get the deep learning.”  
 
Due to this experience, members have 
become much more aware of the pitfalls 
and levels of commitment needed in 
funder collaborations. The experience has 
increased their commitment to funder 
collaboration, but now they do things 
differently as a result of the difficult 
lessons. In the 15 or so subsequent funder 
collaboratives they have engaged with, 
none of them have repeated the 
experiment with pooled funding. They 
have always engaged less intensely 
through joint funding or strategic 
alignment.  
 
Learning from the ACTS of 
collaboration 
 
There is much to learn from this 
fascinating story. There are both light and 
dark elements in funder collaboration. We 
need to acknowledge this shadow side if 
we are to mitigate the inherent risks. In 
this case study we see that the process of 
collaboration required: 
 
• Ambition, but brought the risk of 
hubris 
• Commitment, but carried the 
temptation to control 
• Trust, but could be exclusive and 
easily lost 
• Systems and structures, but were 
costly and time-consuming to set 
up from scratch 
 
This example therefore reveals that 
successful funder collaborations need:  
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Ambition tempered by humility  
 
Without ambition this funder collaborative 
would never have started. It was the 
motivating force that gave energy and 
excitement. It took courage to refuse to 
accept the status quo – a fragmented 
approach where governments, civil society 
and funders all pull in different directions. 
The dream of changing the rules of the 
game for funders was inspiring. They were 
prepared to risk and pioneer a new way of 
working together. They had the courage to 
try something, when most foundations only 
dared to talk about it.  
 
As they worked together, their courage 
and ambition increased. They were able to 
share the risk. None of the agencies would 
have dared to fund this project alone. As 
they went through the ups and downs of 
the project, the collaboration gave them 
the motivation and belief that they could 
overcome the huge obstacles. 
 
 
 
But there was a shadow side to the 
“astonishing ambition” (as one member 
described it). It meant they lost a sense of 
what was realistically achievable in such a 
difficult context. As one member admitted: 
“It was a bit of a vanity project.” The 
degree of difficulty they set themselves 
meant they were almost bound to fail. 
They chose: 
1. The most complex and intensive 
collaboration (joint venture with 
pooled funding) 
2. Four members of the collaborative 
(rather than the usual two) 
3. Highly diverse members (in terms of 
motivation, values and approach) 
4. To take an ‘engaged’ funder 
approach, working through just one 
implementing partner (though this was 
not the original intention, but what 
occurred by default) 
5. To develop and learn from an 
untested, integrated and multi-sectoral 
programme which depended for 
success on the smooth functioning of 
a web of inter-connected relationships 
(such as community groups, service 
providers, local government) 
6. To implement such a complex project 
in Tangababwe, where local civil 
society capacity and local government 
is weak  
7. To try and prove measurable change 
in children – the most vulnerable 
members of society with whom it is 
extremely difficult to prove causality 
8. To accomplish everything in five years  
9. To aim to change the whole approach 
to collaboration amongst international 
NGOs, local NGOs, CBOs, local and 
national government in Tangababwe 
10. To aim to influence the global 
foundations’ approach to 
collaboration. 
 
Each one of these elements on its own is 
difficult enough. Together the risks were 
multiplied exponentially. Imagining it would 
be possible to tackle all ten simultaneously 
smacks of hubris. As four agencies 
together, they may have had a heightened 
and unrealistic sense of what might be 
achievable in such a challenging context. 
Funder collaborations need ambition and 
courage, tempered by realism and 
humility. 
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Commitment without control 
 
Collaboration is costly at the best of times. 
It will probably not save much time or 
money. It is not something that funders 
can play at. If a collaboration is to be 
greater than the sum of its parts, it 
requires serious investment and 
commitment. This case study 
demonstrates an extraordinary and 
exemplary level of commitment from its 
members.  
 
Each member made large financial 
commitments. But perhaps more 
importantly, was the commitment of the 
individuals involved. Each of the agencies 
invested a significant proportion of senior 
managers’ time. These were not just any 
senior managers. Three of the members 
assigned their chief executives to be one 
of their two steering committee members. 
Each of the agencies made considerable 
compromises to make the collaboration 
work. Some gave up their priority focus 
areas; others gave up on their grant 
management and reporting systems. For 
the success of the collaborative, they were 
prepared to be in a “constant fight to keep 
individual perspectives and organisational 
imperatives at bay”.  
 
 
 
But being a collaborative of four committed 
funders together added even greater 
weight to the inherent donor power 
dynamic. Funder control over resources 
was four times greater, effectively 
centralising power away from the field. 
The individuals involved in the 
collaborative were all strong personalities 
as well as respected technical experts in 
their particular fields. Added to this, they 
chose to take an ‘engaged approach’ to 
funding whereby they were highly involved 
in proposal development and “discussions 
of the specific details of project 
management”. It was easy for such 
ownership and high commitment to 
become quite controlling and 
disempowering of the field.  
 
Because the steering committee was 
giving so much time, they may have felt 
they had to be visibly adding value by 
making lots of suggestions for 
improvements; after all, as one said: “a 
steering committee has to steer”. To the 
main implementing partner this felt like 
micro-management. Such directive 
involvement worked best in emergency 
situations. As one put it, “We operate best 
as a steering committee in a crisis.” 
However, it did not naturally promote 
genuine local ownership of the project and 
hence prospects for sustainability. 
 
Being a collaborative may have made 
them overcommitted. As one member said 
“We had invested too much to allow it to 
fail.” They had to consider the reputational 
risk for their organisations. Consequently 
the collaboration may have been less 
flexible. Another member admitted: “We 
could not stop because of the other three 
on the bus.” 
 
Trust: a hard, but fragile core 
 
Trust is the key to successful 
collaboration. Trust is not something light 
and fluffy. It is the hard core – the bedrock 
on which collaboration can be built. How 
well a funder collaborative performs will be 
directly related to the degree of trust 
between members. It was trust between 
the different individuals on the steering 
committee that kept the collaboration 
together when things looked bleak. High 
levels of personal trust enabled the 
collaboration to act quickly and at points of 
crisis. But when trust with the 
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implementing partner broke down the 
relationship disintegrated rapidly.  
 
The joint field visits played a significant 
part in developing the personal 
relationships which grew into high levels of 
respect for each other’s judgments. 
Initially, field visits were undertaken by 
organisations individually or in pairs, 
leading to mixed messages on the ground 
and differing experiences to feed into 
discussions. Once steering committee 
members prioritised travelling together, 
they got to know each other as individuals 
and deep trust developed. “It generated a 
shared understanding and a sense of 
urgency about what we were trying to 
achieve. It broke down barriers between 
people and surfaced individual strengths.”  
 
Once this trust was established, it meant 
that steering committee meetings were full 
of honest challenge and genuine listening. 
By being “constructively disruptive” and 
asking each other hard questions, they 
avoided group-think and were prepared to 
face unpalatable truths. They were not 
precious about having their own airtime in 
meetings. All of the members participated 
fully; it was striking how no one person or 
agency dominated.  
 
 
 
But this story also illuminates the flip side 
of trust. Trust in an inner group can 
become exclusive. As trust began to 
develop amongst the four members, and 
“balance and safety” was reached, 
“membership was effectively locked 
down”. As one member said: “It took us 
some time to get trust within the group and 
we did not want to bring external people 
in.” At times, this meant that they did not 
seek the ideas or advice of others outside 
the collaborative, nor did they achieve one 
of their indicators of success for the 
collaborative – getting other funders to join. 
 
But perhaps even more fundamentally this 
story shows the fragility of trust. When the 
implementing partner did not live up to 
their expectations the collaborative felt 
deeply deceived. Trust was lost almost 
instantaneously. Perhaps it should have 
been obvious from the start that there was 
a mismatch of approaches, theories of 
development, cultures, and financial and 
reporting systems, between the 
collaborative and the implementing 
partner. At best it was only ever a 
marriage of convenience. 
 
Structures and systems that fit 
 
To maintain and develop trust, you need 
structures and systems. This story 
demonstrates the value of appropriate 
structures and systems in any 
collaboration, but also how expensive and 
time-consuming they can be to create from 
scratch. 
 
Collaboration is not easy for autonomous 
foundations and NGOs. It needs people 
with the time and responsibility to make it 
happen. In this case study, members 
learnt the value of “paying attention to the 
servicing process of the collaboration”. 
Establishing a secretariat “made a 
massive difference”, and cost just 0.5% of 
the total budget. Having part-time 
administrator released the energies of the 
steering committee to focus on the big 
picture issues.  
 
This story also illustrates the value of 
sharing responsibilities amongst 
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collaboration members. They shared out 
the necessary tasks fairly equitably based 
on voluntary commitments from each. 
“Once there was clear accountability for 
one piece of the collaboration, then quality 
improved,” according to one member. For 
a while, they chose to separate the 
financial management and the programme 
management roles. Not surprisingly this 
dis-integrated way of structuring left major 
gaps in information. Performance visibly 
improved when they were integrated. 
 
 
 
This collaborative faced major challenges 
with its international structure. The 
steering committee felt that it needed 
some in-country presence to manage the 
day-to-day relationship with the partner. 
Opening and staffing a Tangababwe office 
proved: “unwieldy, ineffective and 
expensive.” Problems with the field 
structure sucked in more steering 
committee time than had been hoped. “We 
were never meant to be so involved. It 
turned into heavy duty management.” 
Closing the office and working through 
part-time consultancy support has 
generally worked better, though it still 
means for partners that they do not 
communicate directly with the steering 
committee. 
 
As a new joint venture, there were no 
shared systems at the start: they had to be 
developed from scratch. Some members 
were forced to compromise their need for 
hard metrics, such as return on 
investment. Sometimes these new 
systems were reduced to the lowest 
common denominator, particularly when 
there were so many other things to do. 
“We would never accept this level of 
reporting from any other project” was a 
constant refrain in steering committee 
meetings. To the implementing partners 
“the rules of the game were never clear” 
and were constantly changing (as the 
collaborative learnt from experience). 
What the collaborative intended to be 
iterative improvement, others experienced 
as inconsistency. It was hard for others to 
engage with a “boat that was being built 
while sailing”.  
 
The collaborative is most proud of its 
monitoring and evaluation system. “We 
invested in a scale and quality of 
independent research to provide valid and 
reliable data on whether the approach 
would work.” They spent $1.8 million (16% 
of the budget) in developing a rigorous 
system for tracking impact, including 
control groups. Yet the final report 
highlights greater variation within 
intervention areas than between 
intervention and non-intervention areas. It 
reveals that the great variability in 
exposure to the intervention, the 
heterogeneity of its implementation and 
changes in the focus of the intervention 
over time, limit the ability of the evaluation 
to identify direct short‐term and long term 
effects. So even such an expensive and 
systematic study cannot overcome 
inherent methodological limitations – 
making attribution questionable. 
 
Seven top tips to take-away 
 
What can other funders learn from this 
experience? Some top tips include: 
1. Treat pooled funding with trepidation  
2. Choose suitable friends  
3. Travel to the field together  
4. Invest sufficient senior staff time 
5. Focus on the partner(s), not just the 
technical programme 
6. Let go of control to genuinely share 
ownership  
7. Organise appropriately.  
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1. Treat pooled funding with 
trepidation  
 
Different types of collaboration suit 
different purposes.7 It is vital to be very 
clear why you are collaborating, what the 
added value is meant to be and how you 
expect that to be realised. Once the core 
purpose has been rigorously thought 
through, the type of funder collaboration 
can be selected accordingly. As one 
member concluded: “If you want to 
collaborate you must work out what level 
you want. You need to think through ‘what 
does this choice mean for risk levels and 
time commitment?’ In future, we would 
think about this choice much more 
systematically.” 
 
This collaborative opted for a joint venture 
with pooled funding approach and no lead 
agency. They did not appreciate how 
challenging this model would be. As one 
member admitted: “We didn’t consider the 
implications of this (joint venture) in a 
rigorous manner… We never really 
analysed the options.” Joint venture 
collaboration involves the creation of a 
new entity - a huge change in the usual 
ways of working for most foundations. In a 
review of a much smaller pooled funding 
initiative, Proscio concluded:  
                                                 
7 dpevaluation 2012 
 
‘Instances at that scale and level of 
complexity are so exceptional that they all 
but prove the critics’ case: while the 
benefits of combining resources may 
seem compelling – including the ability to 
make larger grants and weave together 
multiple kinds of expertise – the demands 
of doing so tend to overwhelm all but the 
most determined efforts at large-scale 
collective philanthropy’ (2010:2).  
 
The scale of these challenges means that, 
while all the agencies have continued to 
develop collaborations with other funders, 
none has gone down the route of pooling 
funds in a joint venture. They have opted 
for “cleaner and more straightforward 
models”, largely involving co-funding.  
 
2. Choose suitable friends  
 
Not only did this collaboration choose the 
most intense and complex form, it chose 
to do this with multiple members. Most 
efforts at joint ventures or pooled funding 
are between just two partners, not four. As 
one funder said: “to keep our trustees 
involved, we limited our collaboration to 
just two”. Most of the funder collaborations 
which members have engaged with 
subsequently have been with just one 
other funder. 
 
It is not just about the right number of 
members, but about their cultural fit with 
each other. Each of the members in this 
example brought different ambitions for 
the collaborative. They also brought very 
different values, approaches and ways of 
working. This diversity “was part of the 
attraction” as it brought both creativity and 
opportunities for learning, but it also 
brought tension. In this case study shared 
interest and commitment to the project 
was not enough. “We worked with 
members with whom we did not share 
enough common ground,” admitted one 
respondent. “Our core differences in our 
approach to being a funder (how 
prescriptive to be) meant that we set up a 
way of working which functioned 
imperfectly for everyone.”  
 
Learning about pooled funding  
 
• Needs a long-term perspective to 
justify the significant start-up costs 
• Is easier if members are open to 
establishing a different identity and 
way of grant-making as it requires 
greater compromise of one’s own 
systems  
• Requires more time of members, 
particularly if also taking an engaged 
funder approach 
• Requires such internal attention that 
this may detract from influencing 
external stakeholders in the areas of 
advocacy and learning, for example 
• May be better as a roll-out of a proven 
method, rather than for learning from 
an innovative approach which 
requires continuous adjustment. 
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3. Travel together to the field  
 
Organisational trust is about personal trust 
between individuals. There is nothing 
more important than personal 
relationships. As members acknowledged, 
“very strong personal rapport and respect” 
were vital for the collaboration’s success. 
 
Travelling together to the field was the 
single most effective way they built trust. 
Members noted: “Spending time together 
on field trips led to a step change in 
relationship. The field trips really helped us 
step up a gear.” They were able to discuss 
their responses to practical field issues, 
which highlighted who they were and what 
they really thought in ways that abstract 
discussions had never done. 
 
Some members also thought that it would 
have been valuable to spent more time in 
each other’s organisations observing how 
they worked in reality, not just in theory. 
Members highlighted the importance of 
“exploring our differences to gain 
understanding”, especially in core process 
areas like grant management. One 
suggested: “We could have sat in each 
other’s grant assessment meetings, for 
example, to gauge how things really work.”  
 
4. Invest sufficient senior staff time 
 
This case study provides an impressive 
example of commitment to collaboration in 
order to make it work. All the members of 
the collaborative invested considerable 
amounts of senior staff time. One 
mentioned it would have helped even 
more if he had managed to “carve out a 
deliberate portion of my time or have a 
dedicated member of staff.” The seniority 
of involvement was impressive too. Having 
leadership engagement on the steering 
committee and mandate from the board 
gave the authority to make decisions 
without continually having to go back to 
their own organisations for approval.  
 
 
5. Focus on the partner, not just the 
technical programme 
 
The project’s success or failure depended 
more on the partner, than the technical 
design. In this example, they designed the 
project first and then looked for a partner 
to implement it for them. With hindsight, 
steering committee members would have 
focused more on the partner, rather than 
the project. The initial process of partner 
analysis was certainly demanding and 
protracted, but ultimately ineffective. 
Prospective partners were assessed 
against a complex matrix of multiple 
criteria. But as one member said: “Without 
a well-grounded organisation, with clear 
vision, strong leadership and sound 
management, the rest is pointless”. Other 
members agree: “You need to start with 
the right organisation – the geography and 
the project can come later. If they have the 
vision and the right approach then a huge 
amount can be achieved. Our wider 
experience validates this – the most 
successful grants are those with strong 
existing local partners.” 
 
The choice of implementing partner in the 
field was probably the most important 
decision that the collaboration made. It is 
ironic that four agencies working together 
put all their eggs in one basket by working 
through just one partner (though this was 
not the original intention). There were 
seven capable and strong-minded leaders 
in London making decisions that then had 
to be implemented through just one 
organisation, even one individual, the field 
director. This proved a severe bottleneck.  
 
6. Let go of control to genuinely 
share ownership  
 
The collaborative approach of the funders 
did not genuinely extend to other 
stakeholders in the project. It was not a 
multi-stakeholder collaboration as many 
now encourage, but a collaboration of 
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funders.8 The partners in Tangababwe 
were contracted in to deliver the funders’ 
product. The significant consultation with 
stakeholders in the early stages, was 
along the lines of ‘what do you think of our 
idea?’ Rather than just sitting together in 
Europe to develop a theory of change, it 
may have been much more valuable to do 
this as a collaborative process with the key 
stakeholders in Tangababwe (after all they 
might know more about what brings 
change in Tangababwe than the funders 
do). This might also have increased local 
ownership and commitment and also 
strengthened the key relationships 
between the actors on the ground (such as 
the intermediary partner, the CBOs and 
the government). To be successful, the 
project needed all the stakeholders to be 
pulling in the same direction and 
performing well, not just the four funders. 
The ethos of authentic collaboration needs 
to extend beyond the funder group - in 
ways that recognise and mitigate the 
power that donors inherently bring. 
 
7. Organise appropriately  
 
Collaboration members learnt how 
important it was to organise and structure 
wisely. They highlighted that “the structure 
for delegating and decision-making needs 
to be absolutely clear.” They found the 
process of clarifying expectations in a 
Memorandum of Understanding a difficult 
but invaluable process. It helped them to 
work out different roles and responsibilities 
and to divide tasks between members, 
preventing duplication and ensuring 
people were held to account. But 
separating financial management from 
programme management proved counter-
productive; performance improved greatly 
when they were integrated – something 
“blindingly obvious in retrospect” as one 
member said. 
 
As one member said: “It is naïve to 
imagine that collaboration happens 
                                                 
8 Leat 2009; Proscio 2010; Prager 2010; 
Rosenberg, Hayes, McIntyre, and Neill 2010 
naturally. We learnt that having a staff 
person is critical”. Establishing a light-
touch secretariat meant that day-to-day 
management and administrative issues 
could be delegated, enabling the steering 
group to focus its energies on strategy. It 
helped ensure clearer communication and 
follow-up of action commitments. “A 
secretariat was invaluable. I don’t think 
any collaborative should be without one.” 
 
Conclusions 
 
This a compelling story of collaboration. It 
is an inspiring example of funders having 
the courage to not accept the usual 
fragmented approach. They believed the 
lives of vulnerable children deserved 
better. After enormous effort they reached 
a stage of performing effectively as a 
funder collaborative.  
 
But this is also a cautionary tale. 
Collaborating with other funders is much 
harder than going it alone. This example 
illustrates the phenomenal costs, 
compromises and commitment involved in 
making a joint venture collaborative work. 
It cautions against pooled funding with 
diverse donors, implementing an 
innovative and complex programme in 
such a demanding context. 
 
This begs the big question - was it all 
worth it? After all, “it was a pretty 
expensive experiment” as one member 
said. In terms of the work on the ground in 
Tangababwe, the honest answer is 
probably not. Steering committee 
members admit that the collaborative has 
not got near to achieving most of its initial 
aims (but this may be more a 
consequence of the unique challenges the 
project faced in-country, rather than funder 
collaboration itself).  
 
What is clear is that despite the costs and 
difficulties involved, the members have 
subsequently scaled up their collaborative 
ventures with other funders. They say that 
the learning they gained from this 
demanding, first-hand experience made it 
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worthwhile. They may be more wary of the 
intensity of pooled funding, but are more 
convinced than ever of the value of funder 
collaboration itself. They are now much 
more aware of the huge risks involved, but 
are choosing to collaborate with other 
funders all the more.  
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Appendix: A typology of collaboration 
 
Of the different typologies of ways in which funders can collaborate, members found this one 
developed by Hamilton (2002) most enlightening. It shows how the depth and intensity of 
collaboration increases as you move down the spectrum. More investment is needed the 
deeper you go. The funder conundrum paper by dpevaluation (2012) provides further 
analysis of where and when different types of collaboration are appropriate.  
 
1. Information 
exchange 
 
To provide ongoing venues for funders to exchange information, 
discuss common interests and learn about issues of common 
relevance. It is also a place where funders connect together and 
establish webs of relationships. Membership tends to be large, 
inclusive and fluid. Often nested within formal organisations such as 
Association of Charitable Foundations or the European Foundations 
Centre. 
2. Co-learning 
 
To facilitate funders’ ongoing engagement and exploration around a 
defined issue or problem, usually with the goal of developing a 
common intellectual framework, a shared approach or agenda, and/or 
positioning an issue differently in the foundation world. Also assists in 
identifying emerging issues and strategic opportunities. Membership 
requirements vary from open to restricted. Often nested within larger 
organisations.  
3. Strategic 
alignment – 
informal 
 
To align different foundations’ resources around a shared strategy – 
participation is generally tied to the expectation of collaborative grant-
making. Many such groups are small (5–20 participants) but some 
have more than 40 members. Governance and administration are kept 
to a minimum, often supported/facilitated by a consultant or staff 
member within a member organisation. 
4. Strategic 
alignment – 
formal 
A more selective and formal grouping than above with specific giving 
expectations. Generally a smaller group. Still maintains a lean 
administrative structure, with an emphasis on aligning funds rather 
than pooling them.  
5. Pooled 
funding 
 
To create a funding pool from multiple sources in order to re-grant for 
a given area/sector/set of issues. Often requires a specific financial 
commitment. Money is typically granted to, held and re-granted by the 
collaborative entity. The decision-making process is specified, 
although processes vary widely. In some cases, the whole 
collaborative makes decisions, while in others grant-making is 
delegated to an intermediary. Administrative and governance 
structures also vary widely from the virtual to the highly formalised.  
6. Joint 
ventures 
 
To operate particular projects rather than serve as a re-granting entity. 
Usually emerge out of perceived void in policy and/or practice, to raise 
the profile of an issue, or to develop new ideas. Often inter-disciplinary 
or cross-sectoral boundaries. May evolve into more traditional 
organisations over time.  
 
 
